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Introduction  
Two questions which continue to absorb Western 
social psychological researchers are: What is the 
‘self’? And ‘What is identity in relation to self?’ At 
the NMPPS this year this Dr. Love’s keynote threw 
these matters into relief prompting us as indigenous 
psychologists to reflect deeply on the nature of 
‘selves’. Many questions arise from her address. Do 
we have ensembled selves? Are we self contained? 
Are we a bit of both depending on the situation? How 
do we work within psychology while honouring 
Māori perspectives?  
 
Questions like these shaped my decision to employ a 
life story model of personal identity within my own 
PhD research ‘on’ Māori identity between 2003 and 
2006.  My choice to do so was based on several 
factors - which are articulated in this paper.   
 
As a starting point I acknowledge that Māori identity 
is under theorised within psychology. More 
specifically, published scholarly works concerned 
with Māori identity tend to be descriptive rather than 
explanatory - often motivated by the desire of the 
writer to articulate a uniquely Māori view of the 
world. As such, literature tends to cohere around how 
Māori identity reflects the cultural traditions, values 
and behaviours of Māori as a people (e.g. Barlow, 
1991; Karetu, 1979, 1990, 1993; Pere, 1979, 1988; 
Puketapu, 1979). This leaves psychological theoretical 
development (that is, explanations of how identity 
operates ‘in the mind’ in a psychological sense, as 
well as a social and behavioural sense) relatively less 
attended to.  
 
This is not to say that Māori are not prolific writers on 
identity, rather that Māori students within this 
discipline are often required to find (or construct) an 
identity model to render their research acceptable 
within the dominant paradigm that we operate. This is 
problematic as Māori ideas and social psychological 
treatments of identity often conflict and many Māori 
have critiqued the applicability of conventional 
psychological wisdom for Māori (e.g. Cram, Smith & 
Johnstone, 2003; Edwards, McManus & McCreanor, 
2005, Liu & Tamara, 1998; Liu, Wilson, McClure & 
Higgins, 1999; McCreanor, Tipene-Leach & Abel, 
2004). Nonetheless, we can continue to borrow ideas 
from Western psychology. Indeed, as qualitative 
researchers within this discipline increasingly shift 
towards methodologies which embrace participant 
centred and narrative based approaches we edge 
closer to constructing that bridge between two spaces. 
 
To explain why I see the life story model of identity 
(LSIM) as a way of creating a space for Māori views 
of identity within psychology I begin with a definition 
of identity within psychology along with a brief 
outline of how Western identity theories emphasise a 
particular view of the self.  I then discuss how the 
LSIM (and associated life story interview process) 
treats the person as a maker of meaning from within 
the ecology from which they emerge. In this way the 
LSIM treats identity as a unified, purposeful aspect of 
self that people construct in order to make 
comprehensible ‘who’ they are and what that means 
as a member of society. This I see as consistent with 
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(although not the same as) indigenous understandings 
of the self which emphasise interdependence between 
individuals and social networks. At the same time, the 
LSIM is becoming an acceptable conventional 
identity model within Western social psychological 
research and, when based within a grounded theory 
methodological foundation this approach enables 
rigorous data collection and analysis. In this way I see 
a bridge between Māori views of identity and Western 
identity theory. (A discussion of the data analysis 
processes (or data presentation) is not provided here - 
I focus specifically upon the links between the LSIM 
and Māori perspectives of identity.)   
Identity theory within a Western Psychological 
Paradigm   
From a Western psychological perspective everything 
a person knows about themselves is stored within 
their ‘self concept’. This comprises the totality of self-
descriptions and self-evaluations individuals have 
available to them as a person and is traditionally 
conceived of as an internal frame of reference (a 
cognitive structure with a physiological basis) which 
guides the individual’s behaviour towards the world 
outside (Gecas, 1982; Gecas & Schwalbe, 1983; 
Rosenberg, 1965, 1979, 1981; Shibutani, 1961).  
 
Identity is defined as part of the self concept that 
relates to social comparison (Josselson, 1996; 
Williams, 1989). People understand who they are by 
relating themselves to others in various ways. They 
then take the information available to them and 
construct their identities to make sense with and relate 
themselves to social categories including gender, 
racial, ethnic, sexual, and class systems. In this way, 
although all people experience having an identity of 
their ‘own’ identity is socially determined. In fact, it 
would be difficult to find anything about ‘personal’ 
identity which is not socially derived (Breakwell, 
1983).     
Theories of identity  
Identity in Western literature has been traditionally 
conceptualised as something the individual must 
resolve, ‘work through’ and consolidate in order to be 
a fully functioning person. For example, early identity 
theorist, Erikson (1968) defined identity as a more or 
less integrated set of self-understandings learned 
during childhood, consolidated during adolescence 
and ideally resolved by the time individuals had 
reached their adult years.  The content of identity as 
an object of examination, he suggested, was the 
person’s answer to the question ‘Who am I’ (self-
definitions) and ‘What does it mean to be ‘me’ as a 
member of society’ (self-descriptions and 
evaluations). The purpose of identity in this view was 
to ‘consolidate’ the individual as a mature adult. The 
more ‘advanced the individual’s identity 
development’ the greater their self-awareness and 
sense of confidence, purpose and meaning. On the 
other hand, the less developed the individual’s 
identity, the more confused they were about their own 
distinctiveness and therefore, they would have to rely 
upon others for direction and a sense of purpose.   
 
His views have been hugely influential in psychology 
spawning a vast array of literature on identity 
development and psychological well being. The most 
often cited elaboration of Erikson’s views is Marcia’s 
(1966, 1967, 1976, 1980, 1993) identity status model. 
Marcia treated identity as a socially constructed 
psychological structure (‘in the mind’) which 
comprised the self-definitions, self-descriptions and 
self-evaluations individuals developed in order to 
function fully as adults. Identity was conceived of in 
terms of four psychological statuses based on the 
amount of exploration and commitment to an identity 
the individual had experienced.  
 
Marcia also developed a quantitative tool to assess 
identity statuses thus providing researchers with a 
‘tangible’ construct to measure - subsequently 
spurring hundreds of empirical studies.  The 
popularity of Marcia’s model is testimony to the 
values which have dominated traditional identity 
research. Much empirical identity research has been 
based upon the notion that individuals are ‘better’ if 
they are individuated (self sufficient) adults who are 
at the centre of their own control. Identity has 
therefore been seen as a problem adolescents must 
resolve (or a challenge that must be met) and – 
psychologists can therefore wrestle identity into a 
stage related statuses which can be verified in terms of 
quantifiable units. 
 
The assumption that individuals hold a measurable 
construct called identity in their minds also 
underpinned the ideas of McCall and Simmons (1968) 
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who proposed role theory. In their view identities (self 
definitions and self meanings) are constructed via 
passive internalisation of social expectations attached 
to social role. These become stored in the mind of the 
individual as ‘role identities’ or sets of concepts that 
determined how one ‘should’ think, feel, as well as 
behave as an occupant of certain social roles. In this 
view the extent to which individuals fulfill this social 
role appropriately determines their level of 
adaptability to the world ‘outside’.  
 
Social identity theory also views identity as an 
internal cognitive structure but emphasises that 
identity emerges at the intersection of self and society. 
Tajfel (1981) made a specific distinction between 
what he called personal identity and social identity. 
Focussing on the role of social group membership on 
identity he defined social identity as  “…that part of 
an individual’s self-concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership in a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that group membership” 
(Tajfel, 1981, p.255). Personal identity was conceived 
of as a general view of the self (including personal 
beliefs about the self, skills, and abilities) influenced 
by social identities, however, quite unique to each 
individual. By differentiating social and personal 
identities, social identity theory sees people’s 
identities as shaped by their group memberships but 
not completely determined by them. The underlying 
assumption however is that identity is personally and 
individually experienced (thus amenable to measure 
and study in terms of exploring the extent to which 
personal beliefs are consistent with social 
expectations).    
 
A variation on this concept was offered by Stryker 
(1968, 1980, 1987) who combined the idea of social 
role with the impact of social contexts. Like McCall 
and Simmons, Stryker also viewed identity as a 
reflection of a person’s social roles. However, he 
sought to clarify how people switch from identity to 
identity depending on social demands. To explicate 
identity changeability he theorised that people’s role-
related behaviour varies in relation to commitment 
and salience. He argued that because people desire 
social acceptance, they emphasise certain social group 
memberships or role identities in certain situations. As 
such, people’s expressed identities do not reflect an 
unvarying or unified set of features a person ‘has’ 
rather, the identity that people express emerges from a 
mixture of role identities which are held in the 
person’s mind and selectively valued, expressed and 
experienced across social situations depending upon 
the degree of commitment and salience those 
identities hold. Identity is viewed as multi-
dimensional with many different role identities 
(including nationality, ethnicity, gender, family, social 
class, occupation and sexuality) varying in salience 
depending environmental demands and associated 
requirement upon the individual to express them 
(Woodward, 2000). 
 
This model of identity therefore moves away from the 
emphasis upon stable self constructs within the mind 
to posit a more fluid model of self which varies 
depending on context. Goffman echoed this 
perspective and defined identity as something adopted 
to accommodate the presence of others. In The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) Goffman 
argued people have many different aspects to their 
identity and can choose to present themselves 
differently across different social situations depending 
on the impression they wish to make. In his view, 
identity was not at all fixed or internal, rather, 
individuals create short-term situated identities, or 
temporary renditions of themselves, and change them 
according to social context (also see Goffman, 1967).  
In this view, people’s identities are ‘fragmented’ and 
constantly changing to gain the acceptance of those 
around them.  
 
What do all these different approaches to identity 
suggest about the self and what it is to have an 
identity?  This plethora of approaches suggests 
identity is a mixture of self experiences – all of which 
are represented within various identity theories. 
Neisser (1988), for example, discriminated five 
primary aspects of the self which have been expressed 
within various identity models.  
 
First, in order to experience identity we need to have a 
sense of the self as an object or actor in the social 
world – that is who we are as a person occupying a 
physical body within a material world at any given 
moment over time. Neisser has referred to this as the 
ecological self - the awareness of this aspect of the 
self is automatic and present from infancy.  
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Second, ‘having’ an identity suggests the presence of 
a ‘private self’. This aspect of self-experience exists in 
the mind of the person who ‘has’ it. This is a 
psychological experience which is never fully 
available for others to see – yet it is experienced as 
real by the individual. For example only I can really 
understand what it is like to identify as a member of 
my own family, although there are many of us who 
belong to my whanau, my own experience of 
belonging will be different from the others and it is 
privately my own.  
 
Third, identity contains elements of a ‘conceptual 
self’ which comprise the diverse forms of self 
information, acquired via socialisation, that relate to 
the person’s membership in various social groups. 
This is partly ‘had’ by the individual – yet it is not of 
their origin and is inherently social in nature. For 
example, my experience of being Māori means I share 
commonalities and a sense of similarity and 
belongingness with other people who share that 
identity.  
 
The notion of the conceptual self turns our gaze to the 
notion of being socially derived – we are what we are 
in relation to others. This same fluid self other 
boundary is what is occurring when an identity 
‘emerges’ from the ‘situated self’ within an immediate 
social interaction with another.  
 
While most of us are aware of a situated aspect of our 
own identities, we are still aware of being the same 
person from situation to situation. The extended self, 
according to Neisser, refers to people’s sense of 
continuity – or more specifically their understandings 
of themselves as human beings who have had a 
continuous experience of being the same person over 
time. This experience of having an integrated or ‘real’ 
identity is an aspect of self-experience known to all. 
In fact, it is difficult to imagine living without an 
identity we see as ‘ours’ that we carry with us 
throughout our lives (Glover, 1988; Smith, 1988).    
 
Thus, in working with identity, one must (ideally) 
recognise various elements of the self (private, social, 
situated, extended, conceptual and ecological). 
Despite this, the fragmentation of self aspects evident 
in the current array of identity theories has lead to a 
reduction of the self into pieces –with different 
theories accounting for different aspects of self 
experience that occur at different levels and at 
different times. This is problematic from a Māori 
perspective – because the self is seen in a holistic 
sense. Moreover, the dominance of the view that 
independence and autonomy are the ideal identity 
states within Western psychological theory is 
problematic from a Māori world view which assumes 
maturity through interdependence and connectedness.  
 
In order to amalgamate the various identity 
perspectives and create a space for Māori ideas 
regarding identity to be spoken I turned to the LSIM. 
This model is more holistic and conceives of the 
individual as constructed by social networks and 
inextricably understood as part of a community of 
meaning that exists within time and space.  
The life-story model  
The LSIM has been emergent within mainstream 
psychology for several years – a process enabled 
greatly by the work of McAdams (1985, 1994, 2001). 
McAdams argued that identity should be seen as 
taking the form of a personal life-story in which life 
phases may be considered ‘chapters’ in the 
individual’s evolving psychological autobiography 
(Atkinson, 1999; Bruner, 1987; 1997; Polkinghorne, 
1988). According to the model, in late adolescence 
and young adulthood people start to organise and 
make meaning of their lives by creating ‘inner’ 
personal histories that reconstruct their own past and 
anticipate their future. To do this they draw upon all 
the events that have happened to them in the past, tie 
them together in a meaningful sequence and use that 
‘story’ to explain who they are, what that means, and 
where they are ‘going’.   
 
In recent years, several theorists have proposed that 
personal life-stories are the best available structure to 
make sense of how individuals come to experience 
and understand themselves as individuals in time 
(Atkinson, 1999; Ezzy, 1998; Kenyon & Randall, 
1997; Sarbin, 1986, 1993).  
 
McAdams (1994) suggested the life-story approach is 
consistent with situation-specific views of identity 
because the expressions of identity people make 
publicly may be viewed as a selection of the 
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appropriate aspects of a person’s own story, tailored 
for the moment in which it is expressed and 
formulated to be appropriate to a particular audience.  
The idea of identity development is also 
accommodated in this model as it assumes that, 
because individuals continue to live their lives and 
accumulate self-knowledge, their life-story is 
continually a work in progress, changing over time 
reflecting changes in the person’s self-understandings, 
social environment, social roles and relationships 
(McAdams, 2001).  
 
The appeal of the treatment of identity as held within 
life-stories is that it incorporates the various aspects of 
self-experience labelled identity by theorists into one 
process of continuous identity formation and self 
development in a way that no other perspective has 
been able to achieve. Moreover, the LSIM enables us 
to conceive identity – not as a possessed thing or 
static structure – but as an ongoing process of self 
development and self construction – experienced by 
the individual yet socially derived and expressed 
through interaction with a community of others who 
share a similar story (Eakin, 2000; Ezzy, 1998; 
Glover, 1988; Leiblich & Josselson, 1994; Linde, 
1993). Thus, although the personal life-story may be 
conceived of as an ‘inner’ identity the position 
enables the individual self to be appreciated in terms 
of important relationships and – thus gives primacy to 
interdependence, interrelatedness among individuals.   
 
Reinforced by the inclusiveness of this approach and 
the ability for the model to embrace personal 
experiences of interdependence and self fluidity I 
adopted the LSIM for my work with Māori  - taking 
the view that identity may be found in the ‘contents’ 
of life-stories – specifically in the self-definitions, 
self-descriptions and associated meanings that 
individuals attach to themselves when asked to talk 
about their identity as Māori.  
  
The appeal of this approach was not only limited to 
theoretical inclusivity. Other features were deemed 
important. For example, there remains a cultural 
preference in Māori society for the use of story-telling 
to pass on knowledge thus rendering the model useful 
for Māori (Bishop, 1996; Bishop & Glynn, 1999). 
Secondly, the approach creates a space for an 
alternative view of the experience of having an 
identity to be voiced.  Unlike other identity models in 
psychology which have tended to measure identity in 
relation to pre established roles, theory or statuses the 
life-story approach opts for the use of open ended 
story-telling to elicit identity perceptions (Bujold, 
1990; Spradley, 1979; Josselson & Lieblich, 1993; 
Schutze; 1981, 1983, 1987 cited in Reimann & 
Schutze, 1991). Thus I was able to explore identity 
from the subject’s perspectives (rather than 
‘measuring’ it using a pre constructed assessment 
instrument) (Bertaux & Kohli, 1984; Bertaux & 
Thompson, 1997; Garfinkel, 1967; Josselson & 
Lieblich, 1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Rosenthal, 
1993). This enabled participants the space to express 
their own stories in their own words without being 
prompted by me (Oplatka, 2001).  
 
Moreover, by their nature, life-stories require 
individuals to explain themselves with reference to the 
social world, relationships and events that shaped 
them (McAdams, 2001). As such, life-stories carry 
explanations for the origins of identity for the person 
in their own social ecology in relation to people, 
places, experiences, groups, cultural values and any 
sources of information they perceived as relevant. 
Using this model therefore, my participants were able 
to speak of the sense of interdependence and 
interrelatedness within the communities within which 
they belonged. They were able to speak of 
experiences in the Māori world, spiritual beliefs, 
cultural values and important relationships with 
whanau, hapu and iwi – without being directed or 
channelled by me. These ideas were then able to be 
validated and expressed throughout the thesis in the 
subjects own words.  
Conclusion  
In using the LSIM I attempted to bridge the gap 
between Māori views of identity and social 
psychological identity theory. Here I do not purport to 
fill the gap in the literature between Māori views and 
identity theory. Of course, there is a still a long way to 
go in terms of bridge building – however - being in a 
position to write about such matters compels you do 
so, even if your concepts are rudimentary and still 
under development. A more appropriate title for this 
paper may have been a ‘make shift bridge’ between 
spaces. I do hasten to add however, although the 
foundations of my bridge may be somewhat unstable 
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at least they enabled me to pass from one space to 
another (Robinson, 2008). It is hoped that these ideas 
add usefully to the growing pool of conceptual 
resources Māori psychologists are generating. As we 
generate our ideas collectively, and continue to 
interpret non Māori perspectives to suit our own needs 
and aspirations, we will continue to develop not just 
bridges between spaces – but also ensure our own 
space continues to expand in new directions. 
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